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ABSTRACT
Logistic Regression (LR) is the most widely used machine learning
model in industry due to its efficiency, robustness, and interpretabil-
ity. Meanwhile, with the problem of data isolation and the require-
ment of high model performance, building secure and efficient LR
model for multi-party becomes a hot topic for both academia and
industry. Existing works mainly employ either Homomorphic En-
cryption (HE) or Secret Sharing (SS) to build secure LR. HE based
methods can deal with high-dimensional sparse features, but they
may suffer potential security risk. In contrast, SS based methods
have provable security but they have efficiency issue under high-
dimensional sparse features. In this paper, we first present CAESAR,
which combines HE and SS to build seCure lArge-scalE SpArse logis-
tic Regression model and thus has the advantages of both efficiency
and security. We then present the distributed implementation of
CAESAR for scalability requirement. We finally deploy CAESAR into a
risk control task and conduct comprehensive experiments to study
the efficiency of CAESAR.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Privacy protections;Usability in se-
curity and privacy; • Computing methodologies→Machine
learning.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Logistic Regression (LR) and other machine learning models have
been popularly deployed in various applications by different kinds
of companies, e.g., advertisement in e-commerce companies [49],
disease detection in hospitals [9], and fraud detection in financial
companies [47]. In reality, there is also increasingly potential gains if
different organizations could collaboratively combine their data for
data mining and machine learning. For example, health data from
different hospitals can be used together to facilitate more accurate
diagnosis, while financial companies can collaborate to train more
effective fraud-detection engines. Unfortunately, this cannot be
done in practice due to competition and regulation reasons. That
is, data are isolated by different parties, which is also known as the
“isolated data island” problem [44].
To solve this problem, the concept of privacy-preserving or se-
cure machine learning is introduced. Its main goal is to combine
data from multiple parties to improve model performance while
protecting data holders from any possibility of information disclo-
sure. The security and privacy concerns, together with the desire of
data combination pose an important challenge for both academia
and industry. To date, Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [34] and se-
cure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) [45] are two popularly used
techinques to solve the above challenge. For example, many HE-
based methods have been proposed to train LR and other machine
learning models using participants’ encrypted data, as a central-
ized manner [3, 4, 8, 15, 18, 21, 25, 27, 43, 46]. Although these data
are encrypted, they can be abused by the centralized data holder,
which raises potential information leakage risk. There are also sev-
eral HE-based methods which build machine learning models in
a decentralized manner [22, 42], i.e., data are still held by partic-
ipants during model training procedure. These methods process
features by participants themselves and therefore can handle high-
dimensional sparse features. Moreover, participants only need to
communicate encrypted reduced information during model train-
ing, and therefore the communication cost is low. However, models
are exposed as plaintext to server or participants during each iter-
ation in the training procedure, which can be used to infer extra
private information [30], even in semi-honest security setting. In a
nutshell, these models are non-provably secure.
Besides HE-based methods, in literature, many MPC—mostly
Secret Sharing (SS) [38]—based protocols, are proposed for secure
machine learning models, e.g., linear regression [17], logistic re-
gression [39], tree based model [16], neural network [36, 40, 48],
recommender systems [7], and general machine learning algorithms
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Figure 1: Sparse feature becomes dense features after using
secret sharing in Z4.
[14, 29, 31, 32]. Besides academic research, large companies are also
devoted to develop secure and privacy preserving machine learn-
ing systems. For example, Facebook opensourced CrypTen1 and
Visa developed ABY3 [31]. Comparing with HE based methods, SS
based methods have provable security. However, since their idea is
secretly share the participants’ data (both features and labels) on
several servers for secure computation, the features become dense
after using secret sharing even they are sparse beforehand. Figure
1 shows an example, where the original feature is a 5-dimensional
sparse vector. While after secretly share it to two parties, it becomes
two dense vectors. Therefore, they cannot handle sparse features
efficiently and have high communication complexity when dataset
gets large, as we will analyze in Section 4.4.
1.1 Gaps Between Research and Practice
We analyze the gaps between research and practice from the fol-
lowing three aspects. (1) Number of participants. In research, most
existing works usually assume any numbers of parties build privacy
preserving machine learning models together [14, 22, 31, 32], and
few of them are customized to only two-party setting. However, in
practice, it is always two parties, as we will introduce in Section
??. This is because it usually involves more commercial interests
and regulations when there are three or more parties. (2) Data par-
tition. Many existing researches are suitable for both data vertically
partition and data horizontally partition settings. In practice, when
participants are large business companies, they usually have the
same batch of samples but different features, i.e., data vertically par-
tition. There are limited researches focus on this setting. (3) Feature
sparsity. Existing studies usually ignore that features are usually
high-dimensinal and sparse in practice, which is usually caused by
missing feature values or feature engineering such as one-hot. How
to build secure large-scale LR under data vertically partition is a
challenging and valuable task for industrial applications.
1.2 Our Contributions
New protocols by marrying HE and SS. We present CAESAR, a
seCure lArge-scalE SpArse logistic Regression model by marry-
ing HE and SS. To guarantee security, we secretly share model
parameters to both parties, rather than reveal them during model
training [22, 42]. To handle large-scale sparse data when calculating
predictions and gradients, we propose a secure sparse matrix multi-
plication protocol based on HE and SS, which is the key to scalable
secure LR. By combining HE and SS, CAESAR has the advantages of
both efficiency and provable security.
1https://github.com/facebookresearch/CrypTen/
Distributed implementation.Our designed implementation frame-
work is comprised of a coordinator and two distributed clusters
on both participants’ sides, The coordinator controls the start and
terminal of the clusters. In each cluster, we borrow the idea of pa-
rameter server [28, 49] and distribute data and model on servers
who learn model parameters following our proposed CAESAR. Mean-
while, each server delegates the most time-consuming encryption
operations to multiple workers for distributed encryption. By verti-
cally distribute data and model on servers, and delegate encryption
operations on workers, our implementation can scale to large-scale
dataset.
Real-world deployment and applications.Wedeploy CAESAR into
a risk control task in Ant Group2, and conduct comprehensive ex-
periments on it. The results demonstrate that CAESAR significantly
outperforms the state-of-the-art secure LR model, i.e., SecureML,
especially under the situation where network bandwidth is the bot-
tleneck, e.g., limited communication ability between participants or
high-dimensional sparse features. Take our real-world risk control
dataset which has around 1M samples and 100K features (3:7 ver-
tically partitioned) for example, it takes 7.72 hours for CAESAR to
finish an epoch when bandwidth is 10Mbps and batch size is 4,096.
In contrast, SecureML needs to take 1,005 hours under the same
setting—a 130x speedup. As far as we know, we are the first secure
LR model that can handle such a large-scale dataset efficiently.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we review literatures on Homomorphic Encryption
(HE) based privacy-preserving Machine Learning (ML) and Multi-
Party Computation (MPC) based secure ML. The former may not
be provably secure while the later is provably secure.
2.1 HE based Privacy-Preserving ML
Most existing HE based privacy-preserving ML models belong to
centralized modelling. That is, private data are first encrypted by
participants and then outsourced to a server who trains ML models
as a centralized manner using HE techniques. Various privacy-
preserving ML models are built under this setting, including least
square [15], logistic regression [3, 8, 21, 27], and neural network[4,
18, 25, 43, 46]. However, this kind of approach suffers from data
abuse problem, since the server can do whatever computations with
these encrypted data in hand. The data abuse problem may further
raise potential risk of data leakage.
There are also some researches focus on training privacy-preserving
ML models using HE under a decentralized manner. That is, the
private data are still hold by participants during model training.
For example, Wu et al. proposed a secure logistic regression model
for two parties, assuming that one party has features and the other
party has labels [41]. Other researches proposed to build linear
regression [20] and logistic regression [42] under horizontally par-
titioned data. As we described in Section 1, features partitioned
vertically is the most common setting in practice. Thus, the above
methods are difficult to apply into real-world applications. The
most similar work to ours is vertically Federated Logistic Regres-
sion (FLR) [22]. FLR trains logistic regression in a decentralized
2https://www.antgroup.com/en
manner, i.e., both private features and labels are hold by partic-
ipants during model training. Besides, participants only need to
communicate compressed encrypted information with each other
and a third-party server, thus its communication cost is low. How-
ever, it assumes there is a third-party that does not collude with
any participants, which may not exist in practice. Moreover, model
parameters are plaintext to server or participants during each iter-
ation in the training procedure, which can be used to infer extra
information and cause information leakage in semi-honest security
setting [30]. In contrast, in this paper, we propose to marry HE and
SS to build secure logistic regression.
2.2 MPC based Secure ML
Besides HE, MPC is also popularly used to build secure ML systems
in literature. First of all, there are some general-purpose MPC pro-
tocols such as VIFF [11] and SPDZ [12] that can be used to build
secure logistic regression model [10]. Secondly, there are also MPC
protocols for specific ML algorithms, e.g., garbled circuit and HE
based neural network [26], garbled circuit based linear regression
[17], logistic regression [39], and neural network [2, 36].
In recent years, there is a trend of building general ML systems
using Secret Sharing (SS). For example, Demmler et al. proposed
ABY [14], which combines Arithmetic sharing (A), Boolean sharing
(B), and Yao’s sharing (Y) for general ML. Mohassel and Zhang
proposed SecureML [32], which optimized ABY for vectorized sce-
nario so as to computemultiplication of sharedmatrices and vectors.
Later on, Mohassel and Rindal proposed ABY3 [31], which extended
ABY and SecureML to a three-server mode setting and thus has
better efficiency. Li et al. proposed PrivPy [29] that works under
four-server mode. The above approaches are provably secure and
their basic idea is secretly sharing the data/model among multi-
parties/servers. Under thus circumstances, these systems cannot
scale to high-dimensional data even when these data are sparse
which is quite a general case in industrial applications, since secret
sharing will make the sparse data dense.
Recently, Phillipp et al. proposed ROOM [37] to solve the data
sparsity problem in machine learning. However, it needs to reveal
data sparseness which may cause potential information leakage.
For example, when a dataset contains only binary features (0 or 1),
a dense sample directly reflects that its features are all ones if using
ROOM. Besides, when it involves matrix multiplication, ROOM still
needs cryptographical techniques to generate Beaver triples [5],
which limits its efficiency for training. In this paper, we propose
to combine HE and SS to improve the communication efficiency of
the existing MPC based secure logistic regression, which can not
only protect data sparseness, but also avoid the time-consuming
Beaver triples generation procedure.
3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly describe the setting and threat model of
our proposal, and present some background knowledge.
3.1 Data Vertically Partitioned by Two-Parties
In this work, we consider secure protocols for two parties who
want to build secure logistic regression together. Because it usually
involves more commercial interests and regulations when there
are three or more parties. Moreover, existing work on secure lo-
gistic regression mainly focus on two cases based on how data are
partitioned between participants, i.e., horizontally data partitioning
that denotes each party has a subset of the samples with the same
features, and vertically data partitioning which means each party
has the same samples but different features [20]. In this paper, we
focus on vertically partitioning setting, since it is more common in
industry. It becomes more general as long as one of the participants
is a large company that has hundreds of millions of users’ data.
Note that, in practice, when participants collaboratively build
secure logistic regression under vertically data partitioning setting,
the first step is matching sample IDs between participants. Private
Set Intersection technique [35] is commonly used to get matched
IDs privately. We omit its details in this paper and only focus on
the machine learning part.
3.2 Threat Model
We consider standard semi-honest model, the same as the existing
methods [29, 32], where a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
with semi-honest behaviors is considered. In this security model,
the adversary may corrupt and control one party (referred as to the
corrupted party), and try to obtain information about the input of
the other party (referred as to the honest party). During the protocol
executed by the honest party, the adversary will follow the protocol
specifically, but may attempt to obtain additional information about
the honest party’s input by analyzing the corrupted party’s view,
i.e., the transcripts it receives during the protocol execution. The
detailed definition of the semi-honest security model can be found
in Appendix A.
3.3 Additive Secret Sharing
We use the classic additive secret sharing scheme under our two
party (A and B) setting [6, 38]. Let ϕ = 2l be a large integer, x and
y be non-negative integers and 0 < x ,y ≪ ϕ, and Zϕ be the group
of integers module ϕ. Assuming that A wants to share a secret x
with B, A first randomly samples an integer r in Zϕ as a share
⟨x⟩1 and sends it to B, and then calculates x − r mod ϕ as the other
share ⟨x⟩2 and keeps it itself. To this end, A has ⟨x⟩1 and B has
⟨x⟩2 such that ⟨x⟩1 and ⟨x⟩2 are randomly distributed integers in
Zϕ and x = ⟨x⟩1 + ⟨x⟩2 mod ϕ. Similarlly, assume B has a secret
y and after shares it with A, A has ⟨y⟩1 and B has ⟨y⟩2.
Addition. Suppose A and B want to secretly calculate x + y in
secret sharing, A computes ⟨z⟩1 = ⟨x⟩1 + ⟨y⟩1 mod ϕ and B
computes ⟨z⟩2 = ⟨x⟩2 + ⟨y⟩2 mod ϕ and each of them gets a share
of the addition result. To reconstruct a secret, one party just needs
to send its share to the other party, and then reconstruct can be
done by z = ⟨z⟩1 + ⟨z⟩2 mod ϕ.
Multiplication. Most existing secret sharing multiplication pro-
tocol are based on Beaver’s triplet technique [5]. Specifically, to
multiply two secretly shared values ⟨x⟩ and ⟨y⟩ between two par-
ties, they need a shared triple (Beaver’s triplet) ⟨u⟩, ⟨v⟩, and ⟨w⟩,
where u,v are uniformly random values in Zϕ andw = u · v mod
ϕ. They then make communication and local computations, and
finally each of the two parties gets ⟨z⟩1 and ⟨z⟩2, respectively, such
that ⟨x⟩ · ⟨y⟩ = ⟨z⟩1 + ⟨z⟩2.
Supporting real numbers and vectors.We use fix-point repre-
sentation to map real numbers to Zϕ [29, 32]. Assume x ∈ [−p,p]
is a real number where 0 < p ≪ ϕ/2, it can be represented by
⌊10cx⌋ if x ≥ 0 and ⌊10cx⌋ + ϕ if x < 0, where c determines the
precision of the represented real number, i.e., the fractional part
has c bits at most. After this, it can be easily vectorized to support
matrices, e.g., SS based secure matrix multiplication in [13].
3.4 Additive Homomorphic Encryption
Additive HE methods, e.g., Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption (OU)
[33] and Paillier [34], are popularly used in machine learning al-
gorithms [3], as described in Section 2.1. The use of additive HE
mainly has the following steps [1]:
• Key generation. One participant generates the public and se-
cret key pair (pk, sk) and publicly distributes pk to the other
participant.
• Encryption. Given a plaintext x , it is encrypted using pk and a
random r , i.e., JxK = Enc(pk ;x , r ), where JxK denotes the cipher-
text and r makes sure the ciphertexts are different in multiple
encryptions even when the plaintexts are the same.
• Homomorphic operation. Given two plaintext (x and y) and
their corresponding ciphertext (JxK and JyK), there are three types
of operations for additive HE, i.e., OP1: Jx + yK = x + JyK, OP2:Jx + yK = JxK + JyK, and OP3: Jx · yK = x · JyK. Note that we
overload ‘+’ as the homomorphic addition operation.
• Decryption. Given a ciphertext JxK, it is decrypted using sk ,
i.e., x = Dec(sk ; JxK).
Similar as secret sharing, the above additive HE only works on a
finite field. One can use similar fix-point representation approach
to support real numbers in a group of integers moduleψ , i.e., Zψ .
Additive HE operations on matrix work similarly [22].
3.5 Logistic Regression Overview
We briefly describe the key components of logistic regression as
follows.
Model and loss. Let D = {(xi ,yi )}ni=1 be the training dataset,
where n is the sample size, xi ∈ R1×d is the feature of i-th sample
with d denotes the feature size, and yi is its corresponding label.
Logistic regression aims to learn a model w so as to minimize the
lossL = ∑ni l(yi , yˆi ), where l(yi , yˆi ) = −y·loд(yˆi )−(1−y)·loд(1−yˆi )
with yˆi = 1/(1 + e−xi ·w). Note that without loss of generality, we
employ bold capital letters (e.g., X) to denote matrices and use bold
lowercase letters (e.g., w) to indicate vectors.
Mini-batch gradient descent. The logistic regression model can
be learnt efficiently by minimizing the loss using mini-batch gradi-
ent descent. That is, instead of selecting one sample or all samples
of training data per iteration, a batch of samples are selected and w
is updated by averaging the partial derivatives of of the samples in
the current batch. Let B be the current batch, |B| be the batch size,
XB and YB be the features and labels in the current batch, then the
model updating can be expressed in a vectorized form:
w← w − α|B| ·
∂L
∂w
, (1)
where α is the learning rate that controls the moving magnitude
and ∂L/∂w = (YˆB −YB )T ·XB is the total gradient of the loss with
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Figure 2: Approximation results of different methods.
respect to the model in current batch, and we omit regularization
terms for conciseness. From it, we can see that model updation in-
volves many matrix multiplication operations. In practice, features
are always high-dimensional and sparse, as we described in Section
1. Therefore, sparse matrix multiplication is the key to large scale
machine learning. The above mini-batch gradient descent not only
benefits from fast convergence, but also enjoys good computation
speed by using vectorization libraries.
Sigmoid approximation. The non-linear sigmoid function in lo-
gistic regression is not cryptographically friendly. Existing researches
have proposed different approximation methods for this, which in-
clude Taylor expansion [22, 27], Minimax approximation [8], Global
approximation [27], and Piece-wise approximation [32]. Figure 2
shows the approximation results of these methods, where we set
the polynomial degree to 3. In this paper, we choose the Minimax
approximation method, considering its best performance.
4 CAESAR: SECURE LARGE-SCALE SPARSE
LOGISTIC REGRESSION
In this section, we first describe our motivation. We then propose
a secure sparse matrix multiplication protocol by combining HE
and SS. Finally, we present the secure large-scale logistic regression
algorithm by applying the secure sparse matrix multiplication and
its advantages over the state-of-the-art methods.
4.1 Motivation
In practice, security and efficiency are the two main obstacles to
deploy secure machine learning models. As described in Section
2.1, under data vertically partitioned setting, although existing HE
based models have good communication efficiency since they can
naturally handle high-dimensional sparse feature situation, extra in-
formation is leaked during model training procedure which causes
security risk. Therefore, it is dangerous to deploy it in real-world
applications. In contrast, although existing SS based methods are
provable security and computaionally effecient, they cannot handle
high-dimensional sparse feature situation, as is shown in Figure
1, which makes them difficulty to be applied in large scale data
setting. This is because, in practice, participants are usually large
companies who have rich computation resources, and distributed
computation is easily implemented inside each participant. How-
ever, the network bandwidth between participants are usually quite
limited, which makes communication cost be the bottleneck. There-
fore, decreasing communication cost is the key to large scale secure
Protocol 1: Secure Sparse Matrix Multiplication
Input: A sparse matrix X hold by A, a matrix Y hold by B,
HE key pair for A ({pka , ska }), HE key pair for B
({pkb , skb })
Output: Z1 for A and Z2 for B thus that Z1 + Z2 = X · Y
1 B encrypts Y with pkb and sends JYKb to A
2 A calculates JZKb = X · JYKb
3 A secretly shares JZKb using Protocol 2, and after that A gets
Z1 and B gets Z2
4 return Z1 for A and Z2 for B
Protocol 2: Secret Sharing in Homomorphically Encrypted
Field
Input: Homomorphically encrypted matrix JZKb for A, HE
key pair for B ({pkb , skb })
Output: ⟨Z⟩1 for A and ⟨Z⟩2 for B
1 A locally generates share ⟨Z⟩1 from Zϕ
2 A calculates J⟨Z⟩2Kb = JZKb − ⟨Z⟩1 modψ and sendsJ⟨Z⟩2Kb to B
3 B decrypts J⟨Z⟩2Kb and gets ⟨Z⟩2
4 return ⟨Z⟩1 for A and ⟨Z⟩2 for B
machine learning models. To combine the advantages of HE (effi-
ciency) and SS (security), we propose CAESAR, a seCure lArge-scalE
SpArse logistic Regression model.
4.2 Secure Sparse Matrix Multiplication
Protocol by Combining HE and SS
As we described in Section 3.5, secure sparse matrix multiplication
is the key to secure large-scale logistic regression.
Notations. Before present our proposal, we first define some nota-
tions. Recall in Section 3.1 that we target the setting where data are
vertically partitioned by two parties. We use A and B to denote
the two parties. Correspondingly, we use Xa and Xb to denote the
features of A and B, and assume Y are the labels hold by B. Let
{pka , ska } and {pkb , skb } be the HE key pairs of A and B, respec-
tively. Let JxKa and JxKb be the ciphertext of x that are encrypted
by using pka and pkb .
Secure sparse matrix multiplication.We then present a secure
sparse matrix multiplication protocol in Protocol 1. Given a sparse
matrix X hold by A and a dense matrix Y hold by B we aim to
securely calculate X · Y without revealing the value of X and Y.
In Protocol 1, Line 1 shows that B encrypts Y and sends it to A.
Line 2 is the ciphertext multiplication using additive HE, which can
be significnatly speed up by parallelization as long as X is sparse.
Line 3 shows how to generate secrets under homomorphically
encrypted field, as shown in Protocol 2 [20]. Comparing with the
existing SS based secure matrix multiplication (Section 3.3), the
communication cost of Protocol 1 will be much cheaper when Y is
smaller than X, which is common in machine learning models, e.g.,
the model parameter vector is smaller than the feature matrix in
logistic regression model. We present the security proof of Protocol
1 and Protocol 2 in Appendix B.
Enc OP1 OP2 OP3 Dec0
3
6
9
12
15
18
R
un
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
(in
 se
co
nd
s)
OU
Paillier
Figure 3: Running time comparison of different computa-
tion types for OU and Paillier.
4.3 Secure Large-scale Logistic Regression
With secure sparse matrix multiplication protocol in hand, we now
present CAESAR, a seCure lArge-scalE SpArse logistic Regression
model, in Algorithm 1, where we omit mod (refers to Section 3.3),
mini-batch (refers to Section 3.5), and regularizations for concise-
ness. The basic idea is that A and B secretly share the models
between two parties (Line 5 and Line 6), so that models are always
secret shares during model training, and finally reconstruct mod-
els after training (Line 30-Line 33). Meanwhile,A and B keep their
private features and labels. During model training, we calculate the
shares of X ·w using Protocol 1 (Line 10-13), and approximate the
logistic function using Minimax approximation (Line 14 and Line
15), as described in Section 3.5. After it, B calculates the prediction
in ciphertext and secretly shares it using Protocol 2 (Line 16).A and
B then calculate the shares of error (Line 18 and Line 19) and calcu-
late the shares of the gradients using Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 (Line
21-24). They finally update the shares of their models using gradi-
ent descent (Line 26-27). During model training, private features
and labels are kept by participants themselves, while models and
gradients are either secretly shared or homomorphically encrypted.
Algorithm 1 is exactly a classic secure two-party computation if
one takes it as a function.
4.4 Advantages of CAESAR
We now analyze the advantages of CAESAR over existing secret
sharing based secure logistic regression protocols [14, 32]. It can
be seen from Algorithm 1 that, for CAESAR, in each mini-batch
(iteration), the communication complexity between A and B is
O(7|B| + 2d). That is, O(7n + 2nd/|B|) for passing the dataset once
(one epoch), where |B| is batch size, n is sample size, and d is the
feature size of both parties. In comparison, for the existing secret
sharing based secure protocols, e.g., SecureML [32] and ABY [14],
the communication complexity betweenA andB isO(4nd) for each
epoch during the online phase, ignoring the time-consuming offline
circuit and Beaver’s triplet generation phase [5]. Our protocol has
much less communication costs than existing secure LR protocols,
especially when it refers to large scale datasets.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we first describe the motivation of our implementa-
tion, and then present the detailed implementation of CAESAR.
5.1 Motivation
Our proposed CAESAR has overwhelming advantages against ex-
isting secret sharing based protocols in terms of communication
efficiency, as we have analyzed in Section 4.3. Although CAESAR in-
volves additional HE operations, this can be solved by distributed
Algorithm 1: CAESAR: seCure lArge-scalE SpArse logistic Regression
Input: features for party A (Xa ), features for party B (Xb ), labels for B (y), HE key pair for A ({pka , ska }), HE key pair for B
({pkb , skb }), max iteration number (T ), and polynomial coefficients (q0,q1,q2)
Output: models for party A (wa ) and models for party B (wb )
1 Initialization:
2 A and B initialize their logistic regression models, i.e., wa and wb , respectively
3 A and B exchange their public key pka and pkb
4 Secretly share models:
5 A locally generates shares ⟨wa⟩1 and ⟨wa⟩2, keeps ⟨wa⟩1, and sends ⟨wa⟩2 to B
6 B locally generates shares ⟨wb ⟩1 and ⟨wb ⟩2, keeps ⟨wb ⟩2, and sends ⟨wb ⟩1 to A
7 Training model:
8 for t = 1 to T do
9 Calculate prediction:
10 A calculates ⟨za⟩1 = Xa · ⟨wa⟩1
11 A and B securely calculate ⟨za⟩2 = Xa · ⟨wa⟩2 using Protocol 1, and after that A gets ⟨⟨za⟩2⟩1 and B gets the result ⟨⟨za⟩2⟩2
12 B calculates ⟨zb ⟩2 = Xb · ⟨wb ⟩2
13 A and B securely calculate ⟨zb ⟩1 = Xb · ⟨wb ⟩1 using Protocol 1, and after that A gets
〈⟨zb ⟩1〉1 and B gets the result 〈⟨zb ⟩1〉2
14 A calculates ⟨z⟩1 = ⟨za⟩1 + ⟨⟨za⟩2⟩1 +
〈⟨zb ⟩2〉1, ⟨z⟩21, and ⟨z⟩31 and sends ciphertext J⟨z⟩1Ka , J⟨z⟩21Ka , and J⟨z⟩31Ka to B
15 B calculates ⟨z⟩2 = ⟨zb ⟩1 + ⟨⟨za⟩2⟩2 +
〈⟨zb ⟩2〉2, JzKa = J⟨z⟩1Ka + ⟨z⟩2, andJz3Ka = J⟨z⟩31Ka + 3J⟨z⟩21Ka ⊙ ⟨z⟩2 + 3J⟨z⟩1Ka ⊙ ⟨z⟩22 + ⟨z⟩32
16 B calculates JyˆK = q0 + q1JzKa + q2Jz3Ka , and secretly shares JyˆKa using Protocol 2, and after that A gets ⟨yˆ⟩1 and B gets ⟨yˆ⟩2
17 Calculate shared error:
18 A calculates error ⟨e⟩1 = ⟨yˆ⟩1
19 B calculates error ⟨e⟩2 = ⟨yˆ⟩2 − y
20 Calculate gradients:
21 B locally calculates Jgb Ka = JeKTa · Xb
22 B secretly shares Jgb Ka using Protocol 2, and after that A gets 〈gb 〉1 and B gets 〈gb 〉2
23 A calculates 〈ga 〉1 = ⟨e⟩T1 · Xa
24 A and B securely calculate 〈ga 〉2 = ⟨e⟩T2 · XA using Protocol 1, and after that A gets 〈〈ga 〉2〉1 and B gets 〈〈ga 〉2〉2
25 Update model:
26 A updates ⟨wa⟩1 and ⟨wb ⟩1 by ⟨wa⟩1 ← ⟨wa⟩1 − α · (
〈
ga
〉
1 +
〈〈
ga
〉
2
〉
1) and ⟨wb ⟩1 ← ⟨wb ⟩1 − α ·
〈
gb
〉
1
27 B updates ⟨wa⟩2 and ⟨wb ⟩2 by ⟨wa⟩2 ← ⟨wa⟩2 − α ·
〈〈
ga
〉
2
〉
2 and ⟨wb ⟩2 ← ⟨wb ⟩2 − α ·
〈
gb
〉
2
28 end
29 Reconstructing models:
30 A sends ⟨wb ⟩1 to B
31 B sends ⟨wa⟩2 to A
32 A reconstructs wa = ⟨wa⟩1 + ⟨wa⟩2
33 B reconstructs wb = ⟨wb ⟩1 + ⟨wb ⟩2
34 return models for party A (wa ) and models for party B (wb )
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Figure 4: Implementation framework of CAESAR.
computations. To help design reasonable distributed computation
framework, we first analyze the running time of different computa-
tions of additive HE. We choose two additive HE methods, i.e., OU
[33] and Paillier [34]. They have five types of computations, i.e.,
encryption (Enc), decryption (Dec), and three types of homomor-
phic operations: OP1: Jx +yK = x + JyK, OP2: Jx +yK = JxK + JyK,
and OP3: Jx · yK = x · JyK. We run these computations 1,000 times
and report their running time in Figure 3. From it, we can find that
OU has better performance than Paillier, and Enc is the most time-
consuming computation type. Therefore, improving the encryption
efficiency is the key to distributed implementation.
5.2 Distributed Implementation
Overview. Overall, our designed implementation framework of
CAESAR is comprised of a coordinator and two clusters on both
participants’ side, as shown in Figure 4. The coordinator controls
the start and terminal of the clusters based on a certain condition,
e.g., the number of iterations. Each cluster is also a distributed
learning system, which consists of servers and workers and is
maintained by participant (A or B) itself.
Vertically distribute data and model on servers. To support
high-dimensional features and the corresponding model parame-
ters, we borrow the idea of distributed data and model from pa-
rameter server [28, 49]. Specifically, each cluster has a group of
serverswho split features andmodels vertically, as shown in Figure
4, where each server has 5 features for example. Note thatA and B
should have the same number of servers, so that each server pair,
e.g., Server A1 and Server B1, learn the model parameters using
Algorithm 1. In each mini-batch, all the server pairs ofA andB first
calculate partial predictions in parallel, and then, servers in each
cluster communicate with each other to get the whole predictions.
Distribute encryption operations on workers. During model
training for the server pairs, when it involves encryption operation,
each server distributes its plaintext data to workers for distributed
encryption. After workers finish encryption, they send the cipher-
text data to the corresponding server for successive computations.
Take Line 14 in Algorithm 1 for example, each server of A (e.g.,
Server A1) sends partial plaintext data, i.e., ⟨z⟩1, ⟨z⟩21, and ⟨z⟩31, to
its workers (Worker A11 to WorkerA1i) for encryption, and then
these workers send J⟨z⟩1Ka , J⟨z⟩21Ka , and J⟨z⟩31Ka back to Server
A1. The communication cost in each cluster is cheap, since they
are in a local area network. Moreover, two clusters communicate
shared or encrypted information with each other to finish model
learning, following Algorithm 1.
By vertically distributing data and model on servers, and dis-
tributing encryption operations on workers, our implementation
can scale to large-scale datasets.
6 DEPLOYMENT AND APPLICATIONS
In this section, we deploy CAESAR into a risk control task, and
conduct comprehensive expreiments on it to study the effectiveness
of CAESAR.
6.1 Setting
Scenario. Ant Group provides online payment services, whose
customers include both individual users and large merchants. Users
can make online transactions to merchants through Ant, and to
protect user’s property, controlling transaction risk is rather im-
portant to both Ant and its large merchants. Under such scenario,
rich features, including user feature in Ant, transaction (context)
features in Ant, and user feature in merchant, are the key to build
intelligent risk control models. However, due to the data isolation
problem, Ant has transaction features and partial user feature, while
the merchant has the other partial user behavior features, and they
cannot share data with each other. To build a more intelligent risk
control system, we deploy CAESAR for Ant and the merchant to
Table 1: Comparison results
Metric AUC KS F1 Recall@0.9precision
Ant-LR 0.9862 0.9018 0.5350 0.2635
SecureML 0.9914 0.9415 0.6167 0.3598
CAESAR 0.9914 0.9415 0.6167 0.3598
collaborately build a secure logistic regression model due to the
requirements of robustness and interpretability.
Datasets. We use the real-world dataset in the above scenario,
where Ant has 30,100 features and label and the merchant has
70,100 features, and the feature sparsity degree is about 0.02%. The
whole dataset has 1,236,681 samples and among which there are
1,208,569 positive (normal) samples and 28,112 negative (risky)
samples. We split the dataset into two parts based on the timeline,
the 80% earlier happened transactions are taken as training dataset
while the later 20% ones are taken as test dataset.
Metrics. In practice, we adopt four metrics to evaluate model per-
formance for risk control task, i.e., (1) Area Under the ROC Curve
(AUC), (2) Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic, (3) F1 value, and
(4) recall of the 90% precision (Recall@0.9precision), i.e., the recall
value when the classification model reaches 90% precision. These
four metrics evaluate a classification model from different aspects,
the first three metrics are commonly used in literature [24], and the
last metric is commonly used in industry under imbalanced tasks
such as risk control and fraud detection. For all the metrics, the
bigger values indicate better model performance.
Comparison methods. To test the effectiveness of CAESAR, we
compare it with the plaintext logistic regression model using Ant’s
features and the existing SS based secure logistic regression, i.e.,
SecureML [32]. To test the efficiency of CAESAR, we compare it
with SecureML [32]. SecureML is based on secret sharing, and
thus cannot handle high-dimensional sparse features, as we have
described in Figure 1. Note that, we cannot empirically compare
the performance of CAESAR with the plaintext logistic regression
using mixed plaintext data, since the data are isolated.
Hyper-parameters.We choose OU as the HE method, and set key
length to 2,048. We set l = 64 and setψ to be a large number with
longer than 1,365 bits (2/3 of the key length). We fix the server
number to 1 since it is suitable for our dataset, and vary the number
of workers and bandwidth to study their effects on CAESAR.
6.2 Comparison Results
Effectiveness.We first compare CAESAR with plaintext logistic re-
gression using Ant’s data only (Ant-LR) to test its effectiveness. Tra-
ditionally, Ant can build logistic regression model using its plaintext
features only. With secure logistic regression models, i.e., SecureML
and CAESAR, Ant can build better logistic regression model together
with the merchant, without compromising their private data. We
summarize their comparison results in Table 1. From it, we can
observe that Ant-LR can already achieve satisfying performance.
However, we also find that SecureML and CAESAR have the same
performance, i.e., they consistently achieve much better perfor-
mance than Ant-LR. Take Recall@0.9precision—the most practical
metric in industry—for example, CAESAR increases the recall rate of
Ant-LR as high as 36.55% while remaining the same precision (90%).
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Figure 5: Running time (per epoch) comparison with respect to sample size by varying bandwidth (batch size = 1,024).
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Figure 6: Running time (per epoch) comparison with respect to sample size by varying bandwidth (batch size = 4,096).
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Figure 7: Effects of parameters on CAESAR.
This means that CAESAR captures 36.55% more risky transactions
than the traditional Ant-LR model while keeping the same accuracy,
which is quite a high improvement in risk control task. The result
is easy to explain: more valuable features will naturally improve
risk control ability, which indicates the effectiveness of CAESAR.
Efficiency. We compare CAESAR with SecureML to test its effi-
ciency. To do this, we set the worker number to 10, use all the
features, and vary network bandwidth to study the running time of
both CAESAR and SecureML for passing the data once (one epoch).
We show the results in Figure 5 and Figure 6, where we set batch
size to 1,024 and 4,096, respectively. From them, we observe that,
CAESAR consistently achieves better efficiency than SecureML, espe-
cially when the network bandwidth is limited. Specifically, take Fig-
ure 5 for example, CAESAR improves the running speed of SecureML
by 40x, 25x, 18x, 13x, in average, when the network bandwidth are
10Mbps, 20Mbps, 30Mbps, and 40Mbps, respectively. Moreover, we
also find that, increasing batch size will also improve the speedup of
CAESAR against SecureML. Take bandwidth=10Mbps for example,
CAESAR improves the running speed of SecureML 40x and 130x
when batch size are 1,024 and 4,096, respectively. One should also
notice that, for SecureML, we only count the online running time,
and it will take much longer time if we count the offline Beaver’s
triples generation time.
6.3 Parameter Analysis
To further study the efficiency of CAESAR, we change the number
of workers, the number of feature, batch size, and bandwidth, and
report the running time of CAESAR per epoch.
Effect of worker number.We first use all the features, fix batch
size to 8,192, and bandwidth to 32Mbps to study the effect of worker
number on CAESAR. From Figure 7 (a), we can find that worker
number significantly affects the efficiency of CAESAR. With more
workers, CAESAR can scale to large datasets, which indicates the
scalability of our distributed implementation.
Effect of feature number.We then fixworker number to 10, batch
size to 8,192, and bandwidth to 32Mbps to study the effect of feature
number on CAESAR. We can find from Figure 7 (b) that CAESAR scales
linearly with feature size, the same as we have analyzed in Section
4.3, which proves the scalability of CAESAR.
Effect of batch size. Next, we fix worker number to 10, use all the
features, and set bandwidth to 32Mbps to study the effect of batch
size on CAESAR. From Figure 7 (c), we find that the running time
of CAESAR decreases when batch size increases. This is because
in each epoch, the communication complexity between A and B
is O(7n + 2nd/|B|), as we analyzed in Section 4.3, and therefore,
increasing batch size will decrease the running time of each epoch.
Effect of network bandwidth. Finally, we fix worker number to
10, use all the features, and set batch size to 8,192 to study the
effect of bandwidth on CAESAR. We observe from Figure 7 (d) that
the running time of CAESAR also decreases with the increases of
bandwidth, which is consistent with common sense. However, when
bandwidth is large enough, the running time of CAESAR tends to be
stable, this is because computation time, instead of communication
time, becomes the new bottleneck.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, to solve the efficiency and security problem of the
existing secure and privacy-preserving logistic regression models,
we proposed CAESAR, which combines homomorphic encryption
and secret sharing to build seCure lArge-scalE SpArse logistic Re-
gression model. We then implemented CAESAR distributedly across
different parties. Finally, we deployed CAESAR into a risk control
task and conducted experiments on it. In the future, we would like
to modify CAESAR to more machine learning models and deploy
them into more applications inside and outside Ant Group.
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A SECURITY DEFINITION
The two-party primitives considered in this paper pertain to the
category of secure two-party computation. Specifically, secure two-
party computation is a two-party random process. It maps pairs of
inputs (one from each party) to pairs of outputs (one for each party),
while preserving several security properties, such as correctness,
privacy, and independence of inputs [23]. This random process is
called functionality. Formally, denote a two-output functionality
f = (f1, f2) as f : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗. For a pair
of inputs (x ,y), where x is from party P1 and y is from party P2,
the output pair (f1(x ,y), f2(x ,y)) is a random variable. f1(x ,y) is
the output for P1, and f2(x ,y) is for P2. During this process, neither
party should learn anything more than its prescribed output.
Definition 1 (Security in semi-honest model [19]). Let f = (f1, f2)
be a deterministic functionality and π be a two-party protocol for
computing f . Given the security parameter κ, and a pair of inputs
(x ,y) (where x is from P1 and y is from P2), the view of Pi (i = 1, 2)
in the protocol π is denoted as viewπi (x ,y,κ) = (w, ri ,m1i , · · · ,mti ),
where w ∈ {x ,y}, ri is the randomness used by Pi , and mji is
the j-th message received by Pi ; the output of Pi is denoted as
outputπi (x ,y,κ), and the joint output of the two parties is
outputπ (x ,y,κ) = (outputπ1 (x ,y,κ)), outputπ2 (x ,y,κ)).We say that
π securely computes f in semi-honest model if
• There exist probabilistic polynomial-time simulators S1 and S2,
such that
{S1(1κ ,x , f1(x ,y))}x,y,κ  {viewπ1 (x ,y,κ)}x,y,κ ,
{S2(1κ ,y, f2(x ,y))}x,y,κ  {viewπ2 (x ,y,κ)}x,y,κ .
• The joint output and the functionality output satisfy
{outputπ (x ,y,κ)}x,y,κ  { f (x ,y)}x,y,κ ,
where x ,y ∈ {0, 1}∗, and  denotes computationally indistinguish-
ablity.
B SECURITY PROOF
B.1 Secret Sharing in Homomorphically
Encrypted Field
Functionality of Secret Sharing in Homomorphically
Encrypted Field FSSHEF
Inputs:
• A inputs a homomorphically encrypted matrix [[Z]]b under
B’s public key pkb ;
• B inputs its secret key skb .
Outputs:
• A outputs a share ⟨Z⟩1;
• B outputs a share ⟨Z⟩2, where ⟨Z⟩1 + ⟨Z⟩2 = Z.
Security Proof. We show that Protocol 2 is secure against semi-
honest adversaries. Formally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Assume that the additively homomorphic crypto system
Π = (KeyGen, Enc,Dec) is indistinguishable under chosen-plaintext
attacks. Then, Protocol 2 (denoted as π2) is secure in semi-honest
model, as in Definition 1.
Proof. We begin by proving the correctness of Protocol 2, i.e.,
we prove that ⟨Z⟩1 + ⟨Z⟩2 is equal to Z. According to the protocol
execution, A computes [[⟨Z⟩2]]b = [[Z]]b − ⟨Z⟩1. From the additive
homomorphism of the crypto system Π, we can directly obtain the
fact that the decryption of [[⟨Z⟩2]]b is equal to Z − ⟨Z⟩1.
Therefore, it holds that ⟨Z⟩1 + ⟨Z⟩2 = Z. This proves the correct-
ness of Protocol 2.
We now prove that we can construct two simulators SA and
SB , such that
{SA (1κ , [[Z]]b , ⟨Z⟩1)}[[Z]]b ,skb ,κ  {viewπ2A ([[Z]]b , skb ,κ)}[[Z]]b ,skb ,κ , (2)
{SB(1κ , skb , ⟨Z⟩2)}[[Z]]b ,skb ,κ  {viewπ2B ([[Z]]b , skb ,κ)}[[Z]]b ,skb ,κ , (3)
where viewπ2A and view
π2
B denotes the views of A and B, respec-
tively.
We prove the above equations for a corruptedA and a corrupted
B, respectively.
CorruptedA. In this case, we construct a probabilistic polynomial-
time simulator SA that, when given the security parameter κ,
A’s input [[Z]]b and output ⟨Z⟩1, can simulate the view of A in
the protocol execution. To this end, we first analyze A’s view
viewπ2A ([[Z]]b , skb ,κ) in Protocol 2. In Protocol 2, A does not re-
ceive any messages from B. Therefore, viewπ2A ([[Z]]b , skb ,κ) con-
sists of A’s input [[Z]]b and the randomness rA .
Given κ, [[Z]]b , and ⟨Z⟩1, SA simply generates a simulation of
viewπ2A ([[Z]]b , skb ,κ) by outputting ([[Z]]b , rA ). Therefore, we have
the following two equations:
viewπ2A ([[Z]]b , skb ,κ) = ([[Z]]b , rA ),
SA (1κ , [[Z]]b , ⟨Z⟩1) = ([[Z]]b , rA ).
We note that the probability distributions ofA’s view and SA ’s
output are identical. We thereby claim that Equation (1) holds.
This completes the proof in the case of corrupted A.
CorruptedB. In this case, we construct a probabilistic polynomial-
time simulator SB , when given the security parameter κ, B’s input
skb and output ⟨Z⟩2, can simulate the view of B in the protocol ex-
ecution. To this end, we first analyze B’s view viewπ2B ([[Z]]b , skb ,κ)
in Protocol 2. The only message obtained by B is the ciphertext
[[⟨Z⟩2]]b . Therefore, viewπ2B ([[Z]]b , skb ,κ) consists of B’s input skb ,
the randomness rB , and the ciphertext [[⟨Z⟩2]]b .
Givenκ, skb , and ⟨Z⟩2,SB generates a simulation of viewπ2B ([[Z]]b , skb ,κ)
as follows. It encrypts ⟨Z⟩2 with B’s public key pkb , and obtains
[[⟨Z⟩2]]′b . Then, it generates (skb , rB , [[⟨Z⟩2]]′b ) as the output. There-
fore, we have the following two equations:
viewπ2B ([[Z]]b , skb ,κ) = (skb , rB , [[⟨Z⟩2]]b ),
SB(1κ , skb , ⟨Z⟩2) = (skb , rB , [[⟨Z⟩2]]′b ).
We note that both [[⟨Z⟩2]]b and [[⟨Z⟩2]]′b are the ciphertexts of⟨Z⟩2, and they look the same to B. Therefore, the probability dis-
tributions of B’s view and SB ’s output are identical. We thereby
claim that Equation (2) holds.
This completes the proof in the case of corrupted B.
In summary, Protocol 2 securely computes FSSHEF in semi-
honest model.
□
B.2 Secure Sparse Matrix Multiplication
Functionality of Secure SparseMatrixMultiplication FSSMM
Inputs:
• A inputs a sparse matrix X;
• B inputs a matrix Y.
Outputs:
• A outputs a share Z1;
• B outputs a share Z2, where Z1 + Z2 = X · Y.
Security Proof. We show that Protocol 1 is secure against semi-
honest adversaries. Formally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Assume that the additively homomorphic crypto system
Π = (KeyGen, Enc,Dec) is indistinguishable under chosen-plaintext
attacks. Then,Protocol 1 (denoted as π1) is secure against semi-honest
adversaries in FSSHEF model, as in Definition 1.
Proof. We begin by proving the correctness of Protocol 1, i.e.,
we prove that Z1 + Z2 is equal to X · Y. According to the protocol
execution, A computes [[Z]]b = X · [[Y]]b . From the additive homo-
morphism of the cryptosystem Π, we know that [[Z]]b = [[X · Y]]b ,
i.e., Z = X · Y. After invoking FSSHEF, A and B obtain the shares
Z1 and Z2 satisfying Z1 + Z2 = Z.
Therefore, it holds that Z1 + Z2 = X · Y. This proves the correct-
ness of Protocol 1.
We now prove that we can construct two simulators SA and
SB , such that
{SA (1κ ,X,Z1)}X,Y,κ  {viewπ1A (X,Y,κ)}X,Y,κ , (4)
{SB(1κ ,Y,Z2)}X,Y,κ  {viewπ1B (X,Y,κ)}X,Y,κ , (5)
where viewπ1A and view
π1
B denotes the views ofA and B, respec-
tively.
We prove the above equations for a corruptedA and a corrupted
B, respectively.
CorruptedA. In this case, we construct a probabilistic polynomial-
time simulator SA that, when given the security parameter κ, A’s
input X and output Z1, can simulate the view of A in the protocol
execution. To this end, we first analyze A’s view viewπ1A (X,Y,κ)
in Protocol 1. In Protocol 1, the messages obtained byA are con-
sisted of two parts. One is the ciphertext [[Y]]b ; one is from the
functionality FSSHEF, i.e., Z1. Therefore, viewπ1A (X,Y,κ) consists ofA’s input X, the randomness rA , the ciphertext [[Y]]b , and Z1.
Givenκ,X, and Z1,SA generates a simulation of viewπ1A (X,Y,κ)
as follows.
• SA randomly selects a matrix Y′, encrypts it with pkb and
obtains [[Y′]]b .
• SA simulates the functionality FSSHEF and takes Z1 as the
output for A in FSSHEF.
• SA generates a simulation of viewπ1A (X,Y,κ) by outputting
(X, rA , [[Y′]]b ,Z1).
Therefore, we have the following two equations:
viewπ1A (X,Y,κ) = (X, rA , [[Y]]b ,Z1),SA (1κ ,X,Z1) = (X, rA , [[Y′]]b ,Z1).
We note that as the additively homomorphic cryptosystem Π is
indistinguishable under chosen-plaintext attacks, the probability
distributions of A’s view and SA ’s output are computationally
indistinguishable. We thereby claim that Equation (3) holds.
This completes the proof in the case of corrupted A.
CorruptedB. In this case, we construct a probabilistic polynomial-
time simulator SB , when given the security parameter κ, B’s input
Y and output Z2, can simulate the view of B in the protocol ex-
ecution. To this end, we first analyze B’s view viewπ1B (X,Y,κ) in
Protocol 1. The only message B receives is from the functionality
FSSHEF, i.e., Z2. Therefore, viewπ1B (X,Y,κ) consists of B’s input Y,
the randomness rA , and Z2.
Given κ, Y, and Z2, SB simulates the functionality FSSHEF and
takesZ2 as the output forB in FSSHEF. ThenSB generates a simula-
tion of viewπ1B (X,Y,κ) by simply outputting (Y, rA ,Z2). Therefore,
we have the following two equations:
viewπ1B (X,Y,κ) = (Y, rB ,Z2),
SB(1κ ,X,Z1) = (Y, rB ,Z2).
We note that the probability distributions of B’s view and SB ’s
output are identical. We thereby claim that Equation (4) holds.
This completes the proof in the case of corrupted B.
In summary, Protocol 1 securely computes FSSMM against semi-
honest adversaries in FSSHEF model.
□
